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Abstract
From the characterization of strongly and Bayesian incentive compatible Pareto-optimal mech-
anisms with transferable utilities, we derive the following results. If there are only two types per
individual then a strongly incentive compatible Pareto-optimal mechanism exists. If there are only
two individuals (with more than three types) then there are sets of beliefs (open in the class of all
beliefs) for which no Bayesian incentive compatible Pareto-optimal mechanism exists. If there are
more than two individuals then the class of beliefs for which such mechanisms exist is open and
dense in the class of all beliefs.
JEL Classification: 020, 026, 027
1. Introduction
The present work belongs to a long series of papers studying conditions under which correct revelation
of individual characteristics is obtained for efficient collective decision-making when information is
incomplete and can be used strategically by the agents. More specifically we are interested in getting
first-best (or full information) Pareto-optimality using redistributive transfers so as to elicit truthful
information from individuals (see Arrow, 1979; d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet, 1975, 1979, 1982;
Bensaid, 1986; Cre´emer and McLean, 1985).
Besides the assumption that individuals behave on the basis of perfectly transferable utilities, a
major restriction in the literature is about the beliefs (or subjective probabilities) that each one may
have about any other’s characteristics. In previous works there were conditions given on these beliefs
such that, whatever may be the (perfectly transferable) individual utilities, first-best Pareto-optimality
could be obtained under “Bayesian” incentive constraints. The so-called “independence” assumption
is only one such condition. However, in d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979, 1982) a weaker
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(sufficient) condition was introduced, but its degree of generality remained unclear. Our purpose
here is to clarify the matter. We show two main results. On one hand, when there are two agents,
there exist a non-negligible set of beliefs and utilities such that it is impossible to find a first-best
mechanism under Bayesian incentive constraints. On the other hand, when there are at least three
agents, for “nearly all” beliefs, such a mechanism can be found.
It should be recalled that the explicit introduction of beliefs was motivated by the difficulty of
solving the revelation problem without them. In that case the incentive constraints were formulated
as a “dominant strategy equilibrium,” thus avoiding completely the specification of these beliefs.
Then the problem could be solved only by violating the budget constraint imposed on the transfers
(see e.g., Harsanyi 1967-68, Groves and Ledyard 1987, and the survey given in Groves and Loeb
1975), except in some special cases. In the following, we shall give such a case: the one where every
individual can be of two possible types only. This first result will be proved in Section 2 and will be
based on the characterization of the dominant strategy incentive constraints in terms of dual variables.
Also in this section we shall characterize analogously the “Bayesian” incentive constraints, those
using explicitly the individual beliefs, and recall conditions on them leading to a Pareto-optimal
solution. Then in Section 3 we shall show the contrast between having two and having more than two
individuals. More specifically, when there are two individuals, one can always find pairs of utility
functions such that there exist no Pareto-optimal solution for open sets of individual beliefs in the
space of all beliefs; by contrast, when there are more than two individuals, there exist Pareto-optimal
solutions, whatever the utility functions, for an open dense subset of individual beliefs.
2. Incentive compatibility as a finite system of linear inequalities
In the following we shall consider two kinds of decentralized collective decision problems. For both
kinds, we start from a set N = {1, 2, . . . , i, . . . , n} of individuals who have to choose an alternative
in a compact set X of admissible outcomes. For concreteness, one may imagine that X is a set
of public projects, but this is just an example. Every individual i is characterized by a parameter
αi, describing all his private information and taking value in a set Ai, that we assume finite. Such
an αi will be called the type of individual i. Individual i is supposed to know his own type but to
have incomplete information about the types of the others. Moreover each individual i, of type αi,
evaluates each outcome x through a utility function ui(x;αi), assumed to be continuous in x, and
the quantity ui(x;αi) representing the willingness to pay of agent i of type αi for outcome x; the
utility of agent i is ui(x;αi) + ti, where ti is any monetary transfer. A mechanism is a pair (s, t),
where s is an outcome function from A ≡×ni=1Ai to X and where t is a transfer function from A to
IRN . The outcome function is efficient if, for all α ∈ A,
n∑
i=1
ui(s(α);αi) = max
x∈X
n∑
i=1
ui(x;αi),
and the transfer function is balanced, if, for all α ∈ A,
n∑
i=1
ti(α) = 0.
When s is efficient and t balanced, then the mechanism (s, t) is called Pareto-optimal. For any
individual i, a decision rule ai(·) is a function fromAi to itself, associating to every “true” type αi the
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“announced” type α˜i = ai(αi). The problem is to design a Pareto-optimal mechanism where each
individual i finds in his self-interest to use the “truth-telling” strategy, that is the identity function
(ai(αi) = αi, for all αi ∈ Ai). However, the self-interest criterion may vary. In the literature two
kinds of criteria have been used leading to two different versions of this revelation problem.
In a first version, one supposes that every i is “completely ignorant” of the vector α−i =
(α1, α2, . . . , αi−1, αi+1, . . . , αn) in A−i =×j 6=iAj , and hence one requires that i announce the truth
whatever the types of the other agents. Denoting by A2i the set {(α˜i, αi) ∈ Ai ×Ai : α˜i 6= αi} one
gets a first system of incentive compatibility inequalities that may be imposed on a mechanism (s, t):
∀ i ∈ N, ∀ (α˜i, αi) ∈ A2i , ∀α−i ∈ A−i,
ui
(
s(αi, α−i);αi
)
+ ti(αi, α−i) ≥ ui
(
s(α˜i, α−i);αi
)
+ ti(α˜i, α−i).
(I)
We can interpret these inequalities by looking at all the games in normal form (with complete
information) generated by all possible parameter values α in A, taking for every i the payoff function
ui(s(·);αi) + ti(·) and the strategy space Ai; we see that the strategy α˜i = αi is a dominant strategy
for i. Following Green and Laffont (1979), we call a mechanism satisfying (I) strongly incentive
compatible (SIC). This first version of the revelation problem will be denoted RP. It is summarized
by
RP = (X;A1, . . . , An;u1, . . . , un).
The second version of the revelation problem is obtained from a Bayesian point of view. Follow-
ing Harsanyi (1967-68), we associate to every mechanism (s, t) a game with incomplete information
including explicitly the beliefs (or subjective probabilities) of every individual i concerning the
others’ types.1 This is given, for every i, by a probability transition pi(α−i | αi) from Ai to A−i. For
some results in the sequel we shall impose the reasonable assumption that these beliefs are consistent
(see Holmstro¨m and Myerson, 1983): the individual conditional beliefs are derived from some joint
probability distribution p on A; then pi(· | αi) is the probability distribution computed from p by
conditionalizing on αi the known parameter of i. A family of beliefs {pi; i ∈ N} is also called an
information structure (IS). The payoff of player i of type αi is evaluated, for every strategy vector
(a1(·), . . . , an(·)), as the conditional expected utility∑
α−i
[
ui(s(a1(α1), . . . , an(αn));αi) + ti(a1(α1), . . . , an(αn))
]
pi(α−i | αi).
A mechanism (s, t) is Bayesian Incentive Compatible (BIC) if the truthtelling strategy is a
Bayesian equilibrium in the sense of Harsanyi; it satisfies the following inequalities
∀ i ∈ N, ∀ (α˜i, αi) ∈ A2i ,∑
α−i
[
ui(s(αi, α−i);αi) + ti(αi, α−i)
]
pi(α−i | αi)
≥
∑
α−i
[
ui(s(α˜i, α−i);αi) + ti(α˜i, α−i)
]
pi(α−i | αi).
(II)
This yields a second version of the revelation problem, where the beliefs of the individuals play
an important role. Accordingly we call it a Bayesian Revelation Problem; we denote it BRP and
summarize it by
BRP = (X;A1, . . . , An;u1, . . . , un; p1, . . . , pn).
1. For more properties see d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1979, Section 3.1).
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Clearly, whenever a mechanism (s, t) satisfies (I), it also satisfies system (II) for any IS with the
same sets of types. Therefore if for a given RP we can find a Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanism, we an
also find a Pareto-optimal BIC-mechanism for every BRP with the same sets of types. However, as
will be seen later, Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanisms do not exist in general.
When we fix an outcome function s (efficient or not), looking for a balanced transfer function
t satisfying the BIC inequalities (or the SIC inequalities) amounts to solving a (finite) system of
linear inequalities. Hence we can easily characterize the class of revelation problems and outcome
functions for which the system is consistent, using standard results on linear inequalities. This is
stated in two lemmata that will turn out to be very useful in the sequel.
Lemma 1 Let Λ
def
= ×ni=1IRA
2
i
+ . For any BRP = (X;A1, . . . , An;u1, . . . , un; p1, . . . , pn) and any
outcome function s there exists a balanced transfer function t such that (s, t) is a BIC-mechanism if
and only if, ∀λ ∈ Λ, if
∀ i, j ∈ N, ∀α ∈ A,
pi(α−i | αi)
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(α˜i, αi)−
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(αi, α˜i)pi(α−i | α˜i)
= pj(α−j | αj)
∑
α˜j 6=αj
λj(α˜j , αj)−
∑
α˜j 6=αj
λj(αj , α˜j)pj(α−j | α˜j)
(1)
then
n∑
i=1
∑
(α˜i,αi)∈A2i
λi(α˜i, αi)
∑
α−i
[
ui(s(α˜i, α−i);αi)− ui
(
s(αi, α−i);αi
)]
pi(α−i | αi) ≤ 0. (2)
Proof The set of inequalities∑
α−i
[
ti(αi, α−i)− ti(α˜i, α−i)
]
pi(α−i | αi)
≥
∑
α−i
[
ui
(
s(α˜i, α−i);αi
)− ui(s(αi, α−i);αi)]pi(α−i | αi),
for i ∈ N , (α˜i, αi) ∈ A2i , together with
∑n
i=1 ti(α) = 0, for α ∈ A, can have no solution t if there
exist λ ∈ Λ and µ ∈ IRA such that
∀ i ∈ N, ∀α ∈ A,
pi(α−i | αi)
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(α˜i, αi)−
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(αi, α˜i)pi(α−i | α˜i) + µ(α) = 0 (1.bis)
and
n∑
i=1
∑
(α˜i,αi)∈A2i
λi(α˜i, αi)
∑
α−i
[
ui
(
s(α˜i, α−i);αi
)− ui(s(αi, α−i);αi)]pi(α−i | αi) > 0.
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Otherwise, taking the solution t, multiplying both sides of (1.bis) by ti(α) and summing over i and
α, one would get
0 =
n∑
i=1
∑
α
ti(α)
[
pi(α−i | αi)
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(α˜i, αi)
−
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(αi, α˜i)pi(α−i | α˜i) + µ(α)
]
×
∑
α−i
[
ti(αi, α−i)− ti(α˜i, α−i)
]
pi(α−i | αi) > 0,
a contradiction.
Since (1) and (1.bis) are equivalent, the result follows from a variant of Farkas lemma (see Gale,
1960, pp. 44–47).
By the same reasoning we can derive a similar statement about RPS.
Lemma 2 Let M
def
=×ni=1IRA2i×A−i+ . For any RP= (X;A1, . . . , An;u1, . . . , un) and any outcome
function s there exists a balanced transfer function t such that (s, t) is a SIC-mechanism if and only
if, ∀µ ∈M , if
∀ i, j ∈ N, ∀α ∈A,
∑
α˜i 6=αi
µi(α˜i, αi, α−i)−
∑
α˜i 6=αi
µi(αi, α˜i, α−i)
=
∑
α˜j 6=αj
µj(α˜j , αj , α−j)−
∑
α˜j 6=αj
µj(αj , α˜j , α−j)
(3)
then
n∑
i=1
∑
(α˜i,αi)∈A2i
∑
α−i
µi(α˜i, αi, α−i)× [ui(s(α˜i, α−i);αi)− ui(s(αi, α−i);αi)] ≤ 0. (4)
To illustrate immediately the usefulness of this “dual” approach, we give two applications of
these lemmata.
2.1 Application of Lemma 2
Using this last result, we can prove first that there exists a Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanism whenever
each individual has only two types, that is:
Theorem 1 If |Ai| = 2 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, then, whatever the utility functions and the beliefs, there
exists a Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanism.
Proof Take any µ ∈M and assume that (3) holds. We have to show that (4) also holds. But since
|Ai| = 2, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, there must be, by (3), some α0 ∈ A such that for α˜i 6= α0i , i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
and some ρ ∈ IR+,
µ1(α˜1, α
0
1, α
0
−1)− µ1(α01, α˜1, α0−1)
=µ2(α˜2, α
0
2, α
0
−2)− µ2(α02, α˜2, α0−2) = . . .
=µn(α˜n, α
0
n, α
0
−n)− µn(α0n, α˜n, α0−n) = ρ ≥ 0.
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Clearly, if we permute α˜i with α0i for one (or an odd number of) individual(s) we get negative
equalities (= −ρ). Similarly, if we permute α˜i with α0i for an even number of individuals we get
positive equalities (= ρ). Let us therefore define [α0] as the set
{α ∈ A : for some S ⊂ N with |S| even, αi 6= α0i , if i ∈ S, and αi = α0i , if i ∈ N − S}.
We have α ∈ [α0] if and only if, for α˜i 6= αi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
µ1(α˜1, α1, α−1)− µ1(α1, α˜1, α−i) = . . . = µn(α˜n, αn, α−n)− µn(αn, α˜n, α−n) = ρ ≥ 0.
Thus (4) can be written as follows: for α˜i 6= αi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
n∑
i=1
∑
α∈[α0]
{
µi(αi, α˜i, α−i) [ui(s(α˜i, α−i);αi)− ui(s(αi, α−i);αi)
+ ui(s(αi, α−i); α˜i)− ui(s(α˜i, α−i); α˜i)]
+ ρ[ui(s(α˜i, α−i);αi)− ui(s(αi, α−i);αi)]
}
≤ 0.
Observe that, for all α and all i, using the efficiency of s and the convention α˜i 6= αi, we have
ui(s(α˜i,α−i);αi)− ui(s(αi, α−i);αi)
+ ui(s(αi, α−i); α˜i)− ui(s(α˜i, α−i); α˜i)
≤ −
∑
j 6=i
uj(s(α˜i, α−i);αj) +
∑
j 6=i
uj(s(αi, α−i);αj)
−
∑
j 6=i
uj(s(αi, α−i);αj) +
∑
j 6=i
uj(s(α˜i, α−i);αj) = 0,
so that, in order to get (4), it only remains to show that
n∑
i=1
∑
α∈[α0]
ui(s(α˜i, α−i);αi) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
α∈[α0]
ui(s(αi, α−i);αi).
In the case where n is odd, we get the result immediately since, by the definition of [α0]
n∑
i=1
∑
α∈[α0]
ui(s(α˜i, α−i) =
n∑
i=1
∑
α∈[α0]
ui(s(α˜);αi)
and by the efficiency of s
∑
α∈[α0]
n∑
i=1
ui(s(α˜);αi) ≤
∑
α∈[α0]
n∑
i=1
ui(s(α);αi).
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Besides, by simple changes of variables and the efficiency of s we can write
n∑
i=1
∑
α∈[α0]
ui(s(α˜i, α−i);αi)
=
n∑
i=1
∑
(α˜i,α−i)∈[α0]
ui(s(α); α˜i)
=
∑
α∈A−[α0]
n∑
i=1
ui(s(α); α˜i) ≤
∑
α∈A−[α0]
n∑
i=1
ui(s(α˜); α˜i)
=
n∑
i=1
∑
(α˜i,α−i)∈A−[α0]
ui(s(αi, α˜−i);αi)
=
n∑
i=1
∑
α∈[α0]
ui(s(αi, α˜−i);αi).
Therefore, in the case where n is even, by the definition of [α0] and efficiency, we get for some
j ∈ N ,
n∑
i=1
∑
α∈[α0]
ui(s(α˜i, α−i);αi)
≤
n∑
i 6=j
∑
α∈[α0]
ui(s(α˜i, α−i);αi) +
∑
α∈[α0]
uj(s(αj , α˜−j);αj)
=
n∑
i 6=j
∑
α∈[α0]
ui(s(αj , α˜−j);αi) +
∑
α∈[α0]
uj(s(αj , α˜−j);αj)
≤
n∑
i=1
∑
α∈[α0]
ui(s(α);αi).
The result follows.
Since any SIC-mechanism is also a BIC-mechanism, we immediately get
Corollary 1 If |Ai| = 2, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, then, whatever the utility functions and the beliefs,
there is a Pareto-optimal BIC-mechanism.
Maskin (1986b, Theorem 2) states this corollary and provides a proof only for the case n = 2.
The corollary confirms his intuition for n > 2. Furthermore it is interesting to notice that using
duality has led us to a stronger result: the existence of Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanisms (and not
only BIC-mechanisms) for any n (provided each i has only two types). This might seem surprising
since we know (see Green and Laffont, 1979; Walker, 1980) that in general there exists no balanced
Groves mechanism, that balanced Groves mechanisms are Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanisms, and that,
in many environments, Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanisms must necessarily be Groves mechanisms.2
2. Recall that a Groves mechanism is a mechanism satisfying ∀ i ∈ N,∀α ∈ A, ti(α) =∑j 6=i uj(s(α);αj)− fi(α−i)
for some fi, a real-valued function defined on A−i.
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Hence, the Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanism that exists when each agent has only two types may have
to be chosen outside the class of Grove mechanisms. The following example shows this clearly.
EXAMPLE 1. Let n = 2, Ai = {α+i , α−i }, and X = {0, 1}. Suppose
(i) ui(0;αi) = 0, ∀αi ∈ A, i = 1, 2,
(ii) u1(1;α1) + u2(1;α2) > 0 if and only if α1 = α+1 and α2 = α
+
2 ,
(iii) u1(1;α+1 ) > u1(1;α
−
1 ) > 0 > u2(1;α
+
2 ) > u2(1;α
−
2 ).
The efficient outcome function s satisfies
s(α1, α2) = 1 if and only if u1(1;α1) + u2(1;α2) > 0.
The existence of a balanced transfer function t satisfying the SIC-inequalities can be checked directly:
Indeed we need
u1(1;α
+
1 ) + t1(α
+
1 , α
+
2 ) ≥ t1(α−1 , α+2 )
and
u2(1;α
+
2 )− t1(α+1 , α+2 ) ≥ −t1(α+1 , α−2 ),
t1(α
−
1 , α
+
2 ) ≥ u1(1;α−1 ) + t1(α+1 , α+2 )
and
−t1(α−1 , α+2 ) ≥ −t1(α−1 , α−2 ),
t1(α
−
1 , α
−
2 ) ≥ t1(α+1 , α−2 )
and
−t1(α−1 , α−2 ) ≥ −t1(α−1 , α+2 ),
t1(α
+
1 , α
−
2 ) ≥ t1(α−1 , α−2 )
and
−t1(α+1 , α−2 ) ≥ u2(1;α−2 )− t1(α+1 , α+2 ).
This system reduces to
t1(1;α
−
1 , α
+
2 ) = t1(α
−
1 , α
−
2 ) = t1(α
+
1 , α
−
2 ) = τ,
u1(1;α
−
1 ) ≤ τ − t1(α+1 , α+2 ) ≤ u1(1;α+1 ),
and
−u2(1;α+2 ) ≤ τ − t1(α+1 , α+2 ) ≤ −u2(1;α−2 ).
By (ii) and (iii) a possible solution is to fix t1(α+1 , α
+
2 ) and let
τ = min{u1(1;α+1 ),−u2(1;α−2 )}+ t1(α+1 , α+2 ).
Although the previous system admits a solution, it cannot lead to a Groves mechanism for the transfer
function would have to satisfy
t1(α1, α2) = u2(s(α1, α2);α2) + f1(α2)
= −t2(α1, α2) = −u1(s(α1, α2);α1)− f2(α1),
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implying that the functions f1 and f2 satisfy the system
f1(α2) + f2(α1) < 0 if α1 = α+1 and α2 = α
+
2 ,
= 0 otherwise
which is obviously inconsistent.
Theorem 1 is a positive result on the possibility of finding Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanisms.
However the case of two types per agent is very special and, as already mentioned, one cannot expect
a general existence result for such mechanisms (e.g., see Green and Laffont, 1979, pp. 90–96).
2.2 Application of Lemma 1
Turning now to Bayesian revelation problems, we may, following d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet
(1979), apply Lemma 1 to derive various conditions on the individual beliefs sufficient to ensure the
existence of Pareto-optimal BIC-mechanisms. In the next section we shall see that some of these
conditions are restrictive in the two-agent case, but hardly at all for more than two individuals. In
that case indeed the main condition will be shown to hold generically.
Before presenting our results, let us briefly review the various sufficient conditions. The most gen-
eral condition bearing only on individual beliefs p1, . . . , pn, is called condition C (see d’Aspremont
and Ge´rard-Varet, 1979, 1982). It requires that for every λ in Λ,
∀ i ∈ N, ∀α ∈ A,
pi(α−i | αi)
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(α˜i, αi)−
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(αi, α˜i)pi(α−i | α˜i) = 0 (5)
whenever (1) of Lemma 1 holds. Indeed taking any BRP = (X;A1, . . . , An;u1, . . . , un; p1, . . . , pn)
and any efficient outcome function s, we observe that (2) of Lemma 1 is implied by (5), since, using
the efficiency of s,
n∑
i=1
∑
(α˜i,αi)∈A2i
λi(α˜i, αi)×
∑
α−i
[
ui(s(α˜i, α−i);αi)− ui(s(αi, α−i);αi)
]
pi(α−i | αi)
≤
n∑
i=1
∑
(α˜i,αi)∈A2i
λi(α˜i, αi)×
∑
α−i
∑
j 6=i
uj(s(αi, α−i);αj)−
∑
j 6=i
uj(s(α˜i, α−i);αj)
pi(α−i | αi)
=
n∑
i=1
∑
α
∑
j 6=i
uj(s(α);αj)×
pi(α−i | αi) ∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(α˜i, αi)−
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(αi, α˜i)pi(α−i | α˜i)

=0 (by (5)).
Hence, under condition C, there exists a Pareto-optimal BIC-mechanism.
Condition C is difficult to interpret. However, there are stronger conditions that are easier to
understand. A first one is condition F, which requires that at least one agent have “free beliefs”,
namely
∃ i ∈ N such that ∀ (α˜i, αi) ∈ A2i , p(· | α˜i) ≡ p(· | αi). (6)
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This amounts to saying that the beliefs of agent i are common knowledge. That it is stronger than
condition C is clear since, whenever (1) holds for some λ, summing on both sides of (1) on α−i, we
get ∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(α˜i, αi)−
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λi(αi, α˜i) = 0 ∀ i ∈ N, (7)
so that (1) and (6) imply (5). In fact the first positive result obtained for BRPs (see Arrow, 1979;
d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet, 1975), was based on an even more restrictive condition, the so-called
“independent case” whereby all players are assumed to have free beliefs.
3. On the existence of Pareto-optimal BIC-mechanisms
We have just seen that, with transferable utilities, the search for Pareto-optimal BIC-mechanisms
appears much more promising than the one for Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanisms. However, logically
the situation is not altogether clear. It is known from d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1982) that
condition C reduces to the independent case when n = 2 and the beliefs are consistent. It is also
known from d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1982) that condition C is not a necessary condition: a
two-agent example is exhibited where a Pareto-optimal BIC-mechanism exists but condition C is not
satisfied. In this section we shall try to clarify the scope of Condition C. First, in the case n = 2, we
shall show that there is no hope for a general positive result. In a world of two individuals there exists
a subset of positive measure in the space of beliefs such that no Pareto-optimal BIC-mechanism
exists. However, the scope of Condition C is much larger when the number of individuals is increased.
Indeed, in the case n > 3, we shall prove that condition C is generic: The set of beliefs satisfying
condition B contains an open and dense subset of the set of all consistent beliefs.
3.1 The case n = 2: A class of counterexamples
To construct a class of counterexamples we shall proceed as follows. First we will consider a
particular revelation problem RP for which no Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanism exists. We will
then use this RP to construct a Bayesian revelation problem, BRP, for which no Pareto-optimal
BIC-mechanism exists. Furthermore, we will show that this non-existence also holds in an open
neighborhood of the constructed problem.
Consider a RP with two individuals, X = {0, 1} and A1 = A2 = {1, 2, 3} (in view of the results
of Section 2, we must have at least three types). Say that, for both players, the utility of decision 0 is
equal to 0, whatever their type. The utilities of the agents, when the decision is 1, are
u1(1; 1) = −10; u1(1; 2) = −5;u1(1; 3) = 1;
u2(1; 1) = −6; u2(1; 2) = 4;u2(1; 3) = 6.
With such utilities, the efficient outcome function s(α1, α2) is 0 in the states of the world (1,1),
(1,2), (1,3), (2,1), (2,2), (3,1), and 1 in the others. It may be quickly shown that there is no balanced
transfers allowing for a Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanism. Indeed, let t1(·) = −t2(·) = t(·), and write
the SIC constraints
t(α)− t(α˜1, α2) ≥ u1(s(α˜1, α2);α1)− u1(s(α);α1),
t(α1, α˜2)− t(α) ≥ u2(s(α1, α˜2);α2)− u2(s(α);α2),
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for (α˜i, α1, α2) equal to (3,1,1), (1,2,3), and (2,3,3) for i = 1 and equal to (1,3,2), (3,1,1), and (2,3,3)
for i = 2. We thus get the system of inequalities
t(1, 1)− t(3, 1) ≥ 0
t(3, 1)− t(3, 2) ≥ −4
t(3, 2)− t(3, 3) ≥ 0
t(3, 3)− t(2, 3) ≥ 0
t(2, 3)− t(1, 3) ≥ 5
t(1, 3)− t(1, 2) ≥ 0.
Clearly there is a cycle (t(α, β) which appears only twice, once with coefficient +1, once with
coefficient -1). By summation the left-hand sides cancel out where the right-hand sides sum up to 1.
This shows that the system is inconsistent.
Using this RP (which admits no Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanism) we now construct a BRP and
show that it has no Pareto-optimal BIC-mechanism. The basic idea is to model the dominant strategy
problem in a Bayesian framework. Let there still be two agents and let X = {0, 1}. Define, for
each agent, the identical set of types B, selecting in the product A1 × A2 the points generated by
the indices of the above SIC-constraints (namely, (3,1,1), (1,2,3), and (2,3,3) for i = 1, and (1,3,2),
(3,1,1), and (2,3,3) for i = 2):
B = {(3, 1), (1, 3), (2, 3), (1, 1), (3, 3), (3, 2)}
= {β = (β1, β2) ∈ {1, 2, 3} × {1, 2, 3} : such that either, for some α1 ∈ A1, (β1, α1, β2)
(or (α1, β1, β2)) is equal to (3, 1, 1), (1, 2, 3), or (2, 3, 3), or, for someα2 ∈ A2, (β2, β1, α2)
(or (α2, β1, β2)) is equal to (1, 3, 2), (3, 1, 1), or (2, 3, 3)}.
Also define the utilities U1(x;β) and U2(x;β) on X ×B such that
U1(x;β) = u1(x;β1) and U2(x;β) = u2(x;β2),
and the conditional probabilities P1(b | β), P2(b | β) to be zero whenever b 6= β.
We interpret this framework as follows: Agent 1 is of type (3,1) if his utility is u1(·; 3) and he
“knows” that agent 2’s utility is u2(·; 1). Similarly, agent 2 is of type (3,1) if his utility is u(·; 1) and
he “knows” that agent 1’s utility is u1(·; 3). It is therefore natural to have
P1((3, 1) | (3, 1)) = P2((3, 1) | (3, 1)) = 1
but
P1((3, 1) | (α, β)) = 0 for any (α, β) 6= (3, 1).
These utilities and probabilities are chosen in order that the constructed BRP mimic the initial RP
and will only be perturbed later. Observe that, for any (b, β) ∈ B ×B,
sup
x
[U1(x; b) + U2(x;β)] = sup
x
[u1(x; b1) + u2(x;β2)].
Thus, to the efficient outcome function s for the original RP corresponds uniquely an efficient
outcome function S for the constructed BRP, which is S(b, β) = s(b1, β2), (b, β) ∈ B ×B.
The goal is now to choose a subset of the BIC-constraints and to get an inconsistent subsystem
in the balanced transfers: T1(·, ·) ≡ −T2(·, ·) ≡ T (·, ·) defined on B × B. We start by taking the
11
BIC-constraints corresponding to the retained SIC constraints and complete the system thus obtained
in order to get a cycle, namely to get that every T (b, β) appears only twice, once with coefficient +1
and once with coefficient −1. (The added constraints are singled out by a (∗)). Written in matrix
form, the final system is
(∗)
(∗)
(∗)
(∗)
(∗)
(∗)

+1 −1 0 · · · · · · · · 0
0 +1 −1 · ·
· · +1 −1 · ·
· · +1 −1 · ·
· · +1 −1 · ·
· · +1 −1 · ·
· · +1 −1 · ·
· · +1 −1 · ·
· · +1 −1 · ·
· · +1 −1 0
0 · +1 −1
−1 0 · · · · · · · · 0 +1


T ((1, 1), (1, 1))
T ((3, 1), (1, 1))
T ((3, 1), (3, 1))
T ((3, 2), (3, 1))
T ((3, 2), (3, 2))
T ((3, 3), (3, 2))
T ((3, 3), (2, 3))
T ((2, 3), (3, 3))
T ((2, 3), (2, 3))
T ((1, 3), (2, 3))
T ((1, 3), (1, 3))
T ((1, 1), (1, 3))

≥

0
0
0
−4
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0

Observe that the right-hand sides of the starred equations in this system are automatically zero,
so that the sum of all the right-hand sides is equal to the sum of the right-hand sides of the original
subsystem of SIC inequalities; that is, 1. Since the sum of the left-hand sides of the present subsystem
is identically zero, it is inconsistent. Hence the whole system of BIC inequalities is inconsistent.
The probabilities (P1, P2) used in our constructed example are degenerate. We shall now show
that they can be arbitrarily but slightly perturbed while preserving the inconsistency of the whole
system. Clearly in this whole system we have 60 inequalities and 36 variables. We may rewrite it in
the compact form
AT ≥ U,
where the matrix A of coefficients is a 60 × 36 matrix. Each line of the left-hand side is either
of the form [T (β, β) − T (b, β)] or of the form [T (β, b) − T (β, β)], with b, β ∈ B, implying that
each line of the matrix A has only two nonzero coefficients, one equal to +1, the other equal to −1.
Consequently if we fix an arbitrary variable, say T (b¯, β¯), to the value zero, and consider the resulting
homogeneous system in 35 variables, AT = 0, it can only have the zero solution. Therefore the
rank of the matrix A is equal to 35. In other words, A has a minor determinant of order 35 which is
different from zero. Note that, if we perturb slightly the matrix A to the matrix Aˆ, obtained by taking
probabilities (Pˆ1, Pˆ2) close (for the Euclidean norm) to the probabilities (P1, P2), this determinant
will still be different from zero and the rank of Aˆ to 35.
Now by the Farkas lemma the inconsistency of the system AT ≥ U¯ is equivalent to the
consistency (see Green and Laffont, 1979, Chap. 1) of the following (dual) system in λ ∈ IRB × IRB,
with B = {(b, β) ∈ B ×B : b 6= β}:
A′λ = 0, λU¯ > 0, and λ ≥ 0.
Here A′ is the transpose of the matrix A (and so has rank equal to 35). Moreover the dual system
has a strictly positive solution λ∗. Indeed, taking λ1 ≡ 1, we have A′λ1 = 0, since any column of
A contains five elements equal to +1, and five elements equal to −1, if it corresponds to a variable
T (β, β), and one element equal to +1 and one element equal to −1, if it corresponds to a variable
T (b, β). So for any solution λ¯ to the dual system we may find θ large enough so that
θ(λ¯U¯) + λ1U¯ > 0 and θλ¯+ λ1 > 0.
12
To get the result it remains to show that the “perturbed” dual system
Aˆ′λ = 0, λU¯ > 0, and λ ≥ 0
has also a solution. This results from the following lemma (the proof of which is given in appendix)
on matrices, where the norm of a matrix is taken to be the square root of the sum of the squares of its
elements.
Lemma 3 Let F be the set of µ × ν matrices of rank ν −m, for some m > 0. Let D ∈ F and
y ∈ IRν such that Dy = 0. Then for any η¯ > 0, there exists ε¯ > 0 such that C ∈ F, ‖D − C‖ < ε¯
implies the existence of a vector v such that Cv = 0 and ‖v − y‖ < η¯.
In this way we get (in the space of beliefs) an open subset of beliefs (Pˆ1, Pˆ2) in a neighborhood
of (P1, P2), such that no Pareto-optimal BIC-mechanism exists. This class of counterexamples was
constructed starting from a given RP admitting no Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanism. It can be shown
that the same procedure can be repeated for any such RP (a proof is available from the authors).
Therefore we really have a “large” class of counterexamples in the case n = 2.
3.2 The case n > 2: The genericity of condition C
The argument of the preceding section does not carry over to the case n > 2. In the approach
followed above, Bayesian implementation is akin to Nash implementation, not dominant strategy
implementation, as each agent can announce the preferences of the others. When n = 2 this is of no
consequence. When n is at least equal to 3, the classical result by Maskin (1986b) gives hope that
we might obtain more positive results.3 This is indeed the case.
Let us fix the finite sets A1, . . . , An of individual types and assume that the individual beliefs are
consistent. The space of beliefs P is then simply the unit simplex of IRA+, the set of joint probability
vectors p, and the individual beliefs are the conditional probabilities p(α−i | αi). Also let us denote
by C the set of joint probabilities in P satisfying condition C. The theorem we want to get is
Theorem 2 For n > 2, C contains an open and dense subset of P.
To prove this theorem we shall actually introduce another condition that can be imposed on
the beliefs and we shall show in a sequence of lemmata that this condition determines an open and
dense subset of P and that it is stronger than condition C. The condition denoted C◦, requires that
∃ i, j ∈ N, i 6= j, such that |Aj | ≥ |Ai| and λi ≡ 0 is the unique solution to
∀αi, ∀αj ,
∑
α˜i 6=αi
[p(αj | αi)− p(αj | α˜i)]λi(αi, α˜i) = 0, (8)
where p(αj | α˜i) =
∑
(αk)i 6=k 6=j p(α−i | α˜i), whenever (1) of Lemma 1 has a nonzero solution in Λ.
It is clear that this condition can hold only for n > 2. Denoting by C◦ the set of p in P satisfying
C◦ we have:
Lemma 4 For n > 2, C◦ is open in P.
3. We are thankful to M. Whinston and S. Williams for this insight.
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Proof Take p◦ ∈ C◦. If on one hand the homogeneous system (1) of Lemma 1 admits only the
identically zero solution (so that C◦ holds trivially), it must contain a subsystem of m =
∑n
i=1 |A2i |
equations with a nonsingular m×m matrix of coefficients. By taking p close to p◦ we perturb this
matrix slightly, so that it remains nonsingular, and the corresponding subsystem of (1) still only
admits the zero solution (and C◦ still holds trivially). On the other hand, suppose system (1) has a
nonzero solution in Λ and, for some pair {i, j} ⊂ N , with |Aj | ≥ |Ai|, the homogeneous system (8)
admits only the identically zero solution. Then we can choose a non-singular matrix of coefficients
defined by a subsystem of (8) and, for any p close to p◦, the corresponding perturbed matrix remains
nonsingular. Therefore p ∈ C◦.
Lemma 5 For n > 2, C◦ is dense in P.
Proof Take p◦ ∈ P − C◦. We want to show that, for any ε > 0, there is some pε ∈ P such that
‖pε − p◦‖ < ε and, for some pair {i, j} with |Aj | ≥ |Ai|, system (8) admits only the identically
zero solution (hence pε ∈ C◦). We may as well suppose that p◦ has full support, since, otherwise we
could start from p¯◦ arbitrarily close, with full support, and correspondingly take a smaller ε. Also we
may suppose that for all p ∈ P, such that ‖p− p◦‖ < ε, system (1) of Lemma 1 admits a nonzero
solution in Λ (otherwise the result follows immediately). Let m = |Ai| − 1. There must exist some
α˜i ∈ Ai such that any (m×m)-matrix of the form
[p◦(αhj | α˜i)− p◦(αhj | αki )]h,k=1,2,...,m αki ∈ Ai − {α˜i}, αhj ∈ Aj
which is singular. We may then perturb p◦ and get a nonsingular matrix as follows. Let for every
α−i−j ∈×i 6= 6`=jA` and for αm+1j ∈ Aj − {αhj : h = 1, . . . ,m},
p˜(αki , α
h
j , α−i−j) = p
◦(αki , α
h
j , α−i−j)− ε˜hk > 0 h, k = 1, . . . ,m,
p˜(αki , α
m+1
j , α−i−j) = p
◦(αki , α
m+1
j , α−i−j) +
m∑
h=1
ε˜hk > 0 k = 1, . . . ,m,
and
p˜(αi, αj , α−i−j) = p◦(αi, αj , α−i−j) otherwise,
with |ε˜hk| < δ˜, h, k = 1, . . . ,m and δ˜ small enough so that p˜ ∈ P. Then the associated conditional
probabilities are given by
p˜(αhj | αki ) =
∑
α−i−j
p◦(αki , α
h
j , α−i−j)− ε˜hk∑
α−i
p◦(αki , α−i)
> 0 h, k = 1, . . . ,m
p˜(αhj | α˜i) = p◦(αhj | αi) h = 1, . . . ,m;
so that for h, k = 1, . . . ,m,
p˜(αhj | α˜i)− p˜(αhj | αki ) = p◦(αhj | α˜i)− p◦(αhj | αki ) +
ε˜hk∑
α−i p
◦(αki , α−i)
.
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Clearly, for δ˜ small enough, every ε˜hk can be chosen arbitrarily in the open interval (−δ˜, δ˜), and
hence we can perturb the above matrix in any direction. Therefore, for some direction (i.e., for some
δ˜ and some ε˜hk’s) the matrix
[p˜(αhj | α˜i)− p˜(αhj | αki )]h,k=1,...,m is non-singular.
We may repeat the same perturbation argument for any α′i 6= α˜i and any associated m×m singular
matrix of the above form (with α′i replacing α˜i). Taking δ
′ and the ε′hk’s small enough we may
preserve the non-singularity of the perturbed matrix associated to α˜i. Choosing them appropriately
we get the non-singularity of the perturbed matrix associated to α′i. Since |Ai| is finite we get a finite
sequence of δ’s, εhk’s, and probabilities in P such that taking the δ’s and the εhk’s small enough the
last probability in the sequence, say pε, is in C◦ and such that ‖pε − p◦‖ < ε.
Lemma 6 C◦ ⊂ C.
Proof We only consider the case n > 2. Suppose p ∈ C◦ and, for λ◦ ∈ Λ, λ◦ 6= 0, that (1) of
Lemma holds. We have to show that (5) holds. Since p ∈ C◦, there must be a pair in N , say {1, 2},
such that |A2| ≥ |A1| and λ1 ≡ 0 is the unique solution to (8).
Now, observe that, whenever (1) of Lemma 1 holds for some λ◦,∑
α˜i 6=αi
λ◦i (α˜i, αi) =
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λ◦i (αi, α˜i),
for all i ∈ N . (See (7) above.)
So, by (1) and since n > 2, ∀ (α1, α2) ∈ A1 ×A2,
∑
α−1−2
p(α−i | α1) ∑
α˜1 6=α1
λ◦1(α˜1, α1)−
∑
α˜1 6=α1
λ◦1(α1, α˜1)p(α−1 | α˜1)

=
∑
α−1−2−i
∑
αi
∑
α˜i 6=αi
p(α−i | αi)λ◦i (α˜i, αi)−
∑
αi
∑
α˜i 6=αi
p(α−i | α˜i)λ◦i (αi, α˜i)

=0, for 1 6= i 6= 2 and α−1−2−i ∈
{×jAj : j ∈ N \ {1, 2, i}} ,
that is, ∀ (α1, α2) ∈ A1 ×A2,
p(α2 | α1)
∑
α˜1 6=α1
λ◦1(α1, α˜1)−
∑
α˜1 6=α1
λ◦1(α1, α˜1)p(α−1 | α1) = 0.
But this is nothing else than (8) for {i, j} = {1, 2}, so that if λ◦ satisfies (1) of Lemma 1 we must
have λ◦ ≡ 0. Therefore, ∀α ∈ A, ∀ i 6= 1,
p(α−i | αi)
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λ◦i (α˜i, αi)−
∑
α˜i 6=αi
λ◦i (αi, α˜i)p(α−i | α˜i)
=p(α−1 | α1)
∑
α˜1 6=α1
λ◦1(α˜1, α1)−
∑
α˜1 6=α1
λ◦1(α1, α˜1)p(α−1 | α1) = 0.
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So (5) holds.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2. Observe that, in the proof of the lemmata, we have not
used the consistency of p in any crucial way. Therefore a similar theorem holds for the nonconsistent
case. The advantage of considering the consistent case (apart from notational simplicity) is that the
case n = 2 is clearer: condition C then coincides with independence.
4. Conclusion
We have started the paper by emphasizing the difficulty of finding Pareto-optimal SIC-mechanisms. It
should be noted that it is this same difficulty which motivated in the literature a second-best approach
applying other efficiency criteria, such as “interim efficiency” (see, in particular, Holmstro¨m and
Myerson, 1983; Wilson, 1978). The central result of the present paper actually indicates that,
“essentially”, incomplete information may not generate inefficiencies in the first-best sense, at least
when individual utilities are transferable and for a finite number of types and more than two agents.
There remain areas around this result requiring some complementary work. The proof of the
theorem strongly relies upon the finiteness of the sets of individual types; the nonfinite case deserves
a special treatment. Also, as already observed in d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet (1982), the sufficient
condition on individual beliefs we have considered here, although quite “general”, is not necessary
for having a Pareto-optimal BIC-mechanism (under transferability). More has to be said about those
individual beliefs on the “boundary” of the set given by that sufficient condition.
It should be stressed, to conclude, that there are other routes to Pareto-optimal BIC-mechanisms.
In particular, one route is to consider restrictions on both utilities and beliefs. One can, as in Maskin
(1986b); Bensaid (1986), consider, for a one-dimensional continuous type-variable, a monotonicity
condition on the marginal utilities together with a negative correlation on the beliefs. More general
conditions can certainly be considered along these lines of ideas. Going to nontransferable utility
worlds is also a major issue (see d’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet, 1989).
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 4
Lemma 4 Let F be the set of µ×ν matrices of rank v−m for some m > 0. Let D ∈ F and y ∈ IRν
such that Dy is equal to 0. Then, for any η¯ > 0, there exists ε¯ > 0 such that C ∈ F, ‖D − C| < ε¯
implies the existence of a vector v such that Cv = 0 and v − y < η¯.
Proof Assume that the result were not true. There would exist a δ > 0 and a sequence of matrices
D1, D2, . . . , Dn, . . . in F converging toD such that, for all n, Dnyn = 0 would imply ‖yn−y‖ > δ.
We will show that this leads to a contradiction.
For each n, let us choose an orthonormal basis z¯n = {zn,1, zn,2, . . . , zn,m} of the kernel of Dn.
There exists a subsequence along which z¯n converges to z¯ = {z1, z2, . . . , zm}. For all n we have
Dnzn,j = 0 for all j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, zn,izn,j = 0 for all i 6= j, and ‖zn,j‖ = 1 for all j. By
continuity, we get Dzj = 0 for all j, zizj = 0 for i 6= j, and ‖zj‖ = 1 for all j. Hence z¯ is also an
orthonormal basis of the kernel of D.
There exist µ1, µ2, . . . , µm such that y is equal to
∑m
i=1 µ
izi. Let yn be equal to
∑m
i=1 µ
izn,i.
The vector yn belongs to the kernel of Dn, and a subsequence of {. . . , yn, . . .} converges to y, which
establishes the contradiction.
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